

The United Nations' 1612 Monitoring
and Reporting Mechanism

Lessons from Colombia and South Sudan



About Watchlist

Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict ('Watchlist') strives to end violations against children in armed conflicts and to guarantee their rights. As a global network, Watchlist builds partnerships among local, national, and international non-governmental organizations, enhancing mutual capacities and strengths. Working together, we strategically collect and disseminate information on violations against children in conflicts in order to influence key decision-makers to create and implement programs and policies that effectively protect children.

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Table of Contents

List of Acronyms	vi
Executive Summary	1
PART I	
Background on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism	3
Research Methodology and Limitations	5
Background on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in Colombia	8
Background on the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in South Sudan	9
PART II	
Findings	11
i. Differing Expectations About the MRM's Purpose and Goals	11
ii. The MRM Works Best when there is a Shared Sense of Ownership with Local Partners	12
iii. Clear Guidance for Monitors and Coordinators is Needed	13
iv. A Multitude of Challenges Exist to Reporting and Verifying Violations	14
v. Information Sharing Across Child Protection Communities Strengthens Coordination, Participation, and the Mechanism's Overall Efficiency	16
vi. Creation of Annual Advocacy Strategies Improves Advocacy	17
Conclusion and Recommendations	19
Endnotes	21
Annex	26

List of Acronyms

ANSA	Armed non-state actor
AUC	Autodefensas unidas de Colombia
CAC	Children and Armed Conflict
COALICO	Coalición contra la vinculación de niños, niñas y jóvenes al conflicto armado en Colombia
CTFMR	Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
ELN	Ejército de liberación nacional
FARC-EP	Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GBVIMS	Gender-Based Violence Information Management System
GoF	Group of Friends
GHN	Global Horizontal Note
MARA	Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
MRM	Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OSRSG-CAAC	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
SCWG-CAAC	Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-IO	Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition
SRSR-CAAC	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

Hundreds of thousands of boys and girls in armed conflicts around the world face serious violations of their rights, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, recruitment and use, abduction, attacks on schools and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. Since the adoption of its first resolution on children and armed conflict in 1999, the United Nations Security Council has systematically advanced its Children and Armed Conflict (CAC) agenda. Of particular significance is Security Council Resolution 1612, which established a unique global Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) in 2005 to provide the Council with “timely, objective, accurate and reliable information” on six grave violations against children in armed conflict. Per the Secretary-General’s 2015 annual report, the MRM is currently implemented in 15 conflict situations around the world.

The MRM is a vital instrument designed to protect children in war from some of the most egregious violations of their rights. Documentation through the MRM has been used to list dozens of parties to armed conflict in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s reports—the so-called “list of shame.” It has generated information for 51 country-specific reports, and led to the adoption of 50 conclusions by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC). More than 20 of the listed parties have signed UN action plans to end these grave violations.

While few dispute the MRM’s value, it has not been assessed comprehensively in the decade since its establishment. A review of its strengths and areas for improvement could improve effectiveness and allow key stakeholders, including affected children and communities, to hold it to account.

Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict (“Watchlist”), an independent network of human rights and humanitarian organizations, decided to examine the MRM in 2015, 10 years after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1612. Watchlist undertook research in two countries—Colombia and South Sudan—to identify lessons learned from MRM implementation. The research focused on the national, regional, and local structures through which the MRM is implemented, and primarily its central implementation body at the national level—the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR). While each CTFMR independently implements the MRM based on UN guidelines, it is influenced by the local context, political landscape, and varied levels of financial support.

This report aims to highlight what is working well and offer recommendations to further strengthen and improve the mechanism. The findings and recommendations are meant to inform discussion regarding the next steps the UN could take, both at headquarters and in the field, to advance the protection of children affected by armed conflict. Lessons learned from these two countries may be applicable in other contexts.

Summary of Findings

- Different actors have different expectations about the MRM’s goal and purpose. Several humanitarian service providers said the MRM could strengthen programmatic response for victims, while most UN respondents did not expect the MRM to inform program design and instead favored the collection and reporting of case-specific, UN-verified data.
- The MRM’s effectiveness greatly relies on its ability to mobilize a wide variety of partners to pursue its goals and objectives. In particular, including local knowledge holders significantly enhances monitoring and reporting of grave violations and informs targeted response.
- Both UN and non-UN reporting agencies in the two case countries wanted more orientation and training on information management protocols, data confidentiality guidelines, minimum standards of verification, and information sharing pathways and security protocols.
- Both UN and non-UN respondents in the two countries said grave violations committed against children are underreported due to a multitude of challenges with monitoring, reporting, and verification in hostile environments.
- The MRM could be strengthened through joint CTFMR annual advocacy strategies. Even in situations where no action plans exist, CTFMR members can use such a joint, CTFMR-wide initiative to expand dialogue with local authorities and strengthen national response to grave violations against children.

The research also identified several promising practices in regard to data collection, information sharing and dissemination that could strengthen MRM data collection and response. These could be further explored.

Part I



background on the monitoring and reporting mechanism

The United Nations-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) was established in July 2005 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1612 as a tool for providing the Council with “timely, objective, accurate and reliable information” on six grave violations against children in times of armed conflict.¹ The landmark resolution was the result of years of joint efforts to strengthen the children and armed conflict (CAC) architecture. The MRM is meant to foster accountability and compliance of parties to conflict with international standards and norms, while contributing to effective advocacy and responses to protect and care for children.²

The MRM is implemented in all conflict situations where at least one party to the conflict is listed in the annexes of the Secretary-General’s annual report on children and armed conflict. Once established, it has the mandate to monitor and report on all parties to the conflict. It covers six categories of violations perpetrated against children: recruitment and use, killing and maiming, rape and sexual violence, attacks against schools and hospitals, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access. As per the Secretary-General’s 2015 annual report, the MRM is implemented in 15 conflict situations across the globe.³

At the country level, the mechanism is implemented by the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR),⁴ co-chaired by that country’s highest UN representative—either the Special Representative of the Secretary-General or the Resident Coordinator—and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Country Representative. Other UN agencies,⁵ nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and independent monitoring bodies are often invited to join the Task Force. CTFMRs collect and verify information on grave violations from a variety of sources and report quarterly to the Secretary-General via the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG-CAAC), which is responsible for collating the information. The Task Force’s terms of reference outline each member’s roles and responsibilities. The MRM itself is implemented according to the 2014 UN MRM Guidelines, the 2014 UN Field Manual, and related training materials.⁶

The OSRSG-CAAC uses information reported by the CTFMR to prepare: (1) the Secretary-General’s

country-specific reports, which are presented to the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC), (2) the Secretary-General’s annual report on CAC, which is presented to the Security Council, and (3) quarterly updates shared with the Security Council, known as the Global Horizontal Note (GHN). The body of the annual report covers all MRM countries and other “situations of concern” where the MRM is not present, but which warrant a greater level of scrutiny. In 2015, the annual report covered 23 conflict situations. Since 2002 the annual reports have also included annexes, which “name and shame” parties to armed conflict that are responsible for committing “trigger” violations.⁷ While child recruitment and use was originally the only ground for inclusion in the annexes, Security Council Resolutions 1882 (2009),⁸ 1998 (2011),⁹ and 2225 (2015)¹⁰ expanded the “trigger” for listing parties to include all categories of grave violations, except for denial of humanitarian access. In 2015 the annual report listed 57 parties to conflict for violations against children, of which 49 were armed non-state actors and 8 were government security forces.¹¹

Resolution 1612 also established the SCWG-CAAC—a technical-level group that includes all Security Council Members¹²—and whose main task is to review the Secretary-General’s country-specific reports on children and armed conflict and adopt conclusions, including recommendations to the Council, parties to conflict, and other stakeholders. The Working Group operates under the leadership of a chair, usually an elected Council Member. It meets in closed sessions and decides by consensus.¹³

In addition to its method of “naming and shaming” and working to ensure greater accountability of perpetrators, the Security Council also adopted a compliance-enhancing approach with parties to the conflict. As such, the UN has the mandate to engage with all listed parties and negotiate action plans to end and prevent the violations for which they have been listed.¹⁴ Action plans include time-bound commitments to strengthen compliance with international norms on the protection of children.¹⁵ They are negotiated between the CTFMR and the listed parties with support from the OSRSG-CAAC. If

parties fully comply with the action plan and undertake verified measures to address the grave violations for which they have been listed, they will be considered for delisting from the annexes of the Secretary-General’s report.¹⁶ The CTFMR is responsible for supporting the government or the armed group in implementing the action plan and monitoring compliance. Ultimately, the Secretary-General is responsible for both listing and delisting parties to conflict for grave violations committed against children based on recommendations by the SRSR-CAAC.



research methodology and limitations

In 2015, 10 years after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1612, Watchlist reviewed the United Nations' Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) as it is implemented in 2 countries—Colombia and South Sudan—to see which areas are working well and which could be strengthened.

The research involved a review of documents, interviews with mostly national stakeholders, and observation of MRM implementation on the ground.

It can be divided into three phases: (1) development of a “conceptual framework,” (2) tools creation, and (3) informant interviews and analysis.

1) The Development of a “Conceptual Framework”

Any research into the MRM should be based on a clear understanding of what the mechanism seeks to achieve and how it intends to do so. Watchlist contracted a consulting firm to conceptualize and develop a list of key elements of the MRM. The consultant started with a desk review of 41 articles and reports, published between 2005 and 2014. This review included the 2014 UN MRM Guidelines, the 2014 UN MRM Field Manual and related training materials, as well as the 2013 UN Global Study of Good Practices. The consultant interviewed 14 key informants to further develop the framework, including members of key UN agencies, as well as representatives from international and national nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who have had longtime involvement in the mechanism's implementation. This exercise resulted in a conceptual framework that maps important elements of the MRM based on information from the literature and the key informants.

2) Tools Creation

The lead researcher developed key informant interview guides to provide richer background information on the MRM (see annex). Interview questions were tailored for three types of respondents: (1) individuals participating directly in the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR), (2) donors, and (3) individuals working on child protection programming not directly associated with the CTFMR.

3) Informant Interviews and Analysis

Watchlist considered all 15 countries and situations where the MRM is implemented, but limited its research to Colombia and South Sudan due to funding constraints. The selection of these countries took into account regional diversity and distinct local contexts. Colombia, at the time of the research,¹⁷ was emblematic of annex II countries and prolonged conflicts that do not host a peacekeeping mission. South Sudan, on the other hand, had parties to conflict listed in annex I, had a peacekeeping mission, and an action plan with two listed parties.

Research in Colombia and South Sudan differed based on access and security issues.

In Colombia, the lead researcher spoke with 55 interviewees in July and August 2015. The interviews included thirty-six NGO staff or community members, nine UN staff, eight government officials and two donors. The majority of the interviews occurred in Bogotá. Additional research was conducted in Medellín, Cartagena, and the surroundings, Villavicencio, and the Valle de Cauca, as well as a Skype interview with a respondent in Córdoba. The lead researcher attempted to achieve geographic, ethnic, and organizational diversity among respondents.

In South Sudan, the lead researcher interviewed 57 respondents in November and December 2015. These consisted of 42 NGO or community members and 15 UN staff. The interviews mainly targeted international and national child protection agencies. Data collection primarily took place in Juba, with two field missions to Maban and Bentiu. Watchlist selected Maban because of cross-border violations from Sudanese rebel forces, and Bentiu because it had some of the country's highest rates of grave violations against children. Key informants in Bor and Ganyiel were interviewed via Skype. Watchlist engaged representatives in leadership, coordination, and technical roles from general protection, child protection, gender-based violence and education sectors. Watchlist also interviewed traditional community leaders and members of community child protection networks.

COLOMBIA



SOUTH SUDAN





At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this research, which may have influenced the report's findings and recommendations.

First, due to funding constraints, the number of countries where Watchlist conducted research was limited to 2, while there are 15 countries or situations where the MRM is active. Therefore, this report does not provide a comprehensive overview of MRM implementation across the globe, but rather discusses findings from Colombia and South Sudan only. Second, following initial consultations, the UN decided not to participate in this research. As a result, Watchlist conducted its field research independently from the UN agencies. While some UN employees were interviewed, their views represent their personal experiences of working with the MRM, not their agencies' formal positions. Third, given the direct threats and attacks facing humanitarian and human rights organizations, some interviewees may have been hesitant to speak openly and share information. These challenges and limitations may have affected the breadth and depth of the information collected, as well as the quality of the recommendations.

In conclusion, Watchlist's research in both South Sudan and Colombia focused on national, regional, and local structures through which the MRM is implemented, and primarily targeted the central implementation body of the MRM on the national level—the CTFMR. While each CTFMR independently implements the MRM based on UN guidelines, it is influenced by the local context, political landscape, and varied levels of financial support. Lessons learned from these two countries could be useful for other contexts and Watchlist hopes these findings may encourage further research.



background on the monitoring and reporting mechanism in Colombia

The UN Secretary-General's annual reports on children and armed conflict have included Colombia as a situation of concern since its first publication in 2000.¹⁸ The 2003 report listed three armed non-state actors (ANSAs): (1) the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), (2) the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), and (3) the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN).¹⁹ Between 2003 and 2006, the AUC underwent a formal demobilization process that led to its removal from annex II, but its demobilization was never completely successful. It allowed for the emergence of several splinter groups that share the AUC's structural and operational features, making it difficult to separate politically motivated violence from that of purely criminal nature.²⁰ The FARC-EP and ELN are persistent perpetrators, meaning they have been listed for more than five years.²¹ While there have been reports of grave violations by the Colombian armed forces, the evidence has not reached the threshold for listing.²²

The peace talks between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP offer a significant opportunity to promote compliance with international norms on the protection of children.²³ This development is particularly important given the CTFMR's inability to engage with non-state armed groups without the president's explicit permission, in accordance with Article 10 of Law 418 (1997), extended by Law 548 (1999).²⁴ The Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2261 in January 2016, establishing a yearlong political mission in Colombia that will oversee a bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, and the setting aside of arms by the FARC rebels. The mission transforms the UN's role in Colombia, formally placing the country on the Council's agenda for the first time since the start of the conflict.

The current CTFMR is centrally located in Bogotá and meets monthly.²⁵ At the time of the research, Colombia did not host a UN peacekeeping or political mission. Accordingly, the CTFMR is co-chaired by the Country Representative for UNICEF and the UN Resident Coordinator. While UNICEF is the technical secretariat for the MRM, the Resident Coordinator manages political messaging and coordination.²⁶ The Task Force is composed of key UN agencies and national NGOs.²⁷ The co-chairs are responsible for liaising directly with the Colombian government and more specifically, the Cancillería (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).




background on the monitoring and reporting mechanism in South Sudan

South Sudan is the world's youngest country, seceding from Sudan after a 22-year civil war and forming a nation on January 9, 2011.²⁸ Given the pre-existence of both listed parties and the Sudan-wide MRM, the South Sudan Country Task Force was immediately operational and able to monitor and report on grave violations following the state's creation in 2011. In 2015, three parties to conflict were listed for recruitment and use of children: (1) the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), (2) the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO), and (3) the White Army. The SPLA and SPLA-IO were also listed for killing and maiming of children.²⁹

Listed since 2005, the SPLA is a persistent perpetrator. The SPLA first signed an action plan on the recruitment and use of children in 2009. However, South Sudan's independence brought an important change for the SPLA, as it assumed the duties and responsibilities of a national army. This shift resulted in a "revised" action plan in 2012. In June 2014, the Government of South Sudan re-committed to the 2012 Action Plan to end and prevent grave violations against children, in particular regarding their recruitment and use, attacks on schools and hospitals, and the military use of schools.³⁰ Two months later, a one-year work plan with specific activities and timed benchmarks was developed to help implement the action plan.³¹ In parallel, the SPLA-IO also signed an action plan with the UN in December 2015 to end and prevent grave violations against children, in particular their recruitment and use.³²

In South Sudan's CTFMR, the principle reporting bodies are UN agencies and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). Information on incidents and violations is generally collected during UN-led assessment missions or integrated patrols as part of routine data collection, surveys, or general programmatic activities. UN-led missions are deployed from Juba and include staff from one or multiple UN agencies from a variety of sectors.³³ At times, international and national NGOs also collect data.³⁴ Integrated patrols primarily involve Child Protection Units and non-civilian officers from UNMISS and occur in the regions surrounding the humanitarian regional hubs. UNMISS has Child Protection Units across 10 sites with 27 Child Protection Officers. This concentration of child protection staff in a peacekeeping mission is said to be the second largest in the world.³⁵ UN-led assessment missions and integrated patrols enable verification of earlier reports from non-verifying agencies.³⁶

Part II



Findings

i. Differing Expectations About the MRM's Purpose and Goals

The ultimate goal of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) is to help protect children from grave violations in situations of armed conflict. The mechanism's purpose is to foster accountability and compliance of parties to conflict with international child protection standards and norms, while contributing to effective advocacy and responses to protect and care for children.³⁷

...mandate is interpreted differently by a variety of actors.

The research has revealed that this mandate is interpreted differently by a variety of actors. With regards to accountability, most respondents agreed that the MRM's key purpose is to foster non-judicial accountability through "naming and shaming," diplomatic pressure, and sanctions. However, several respondents in South Sudan mentioned their desire for the MRM to collect more information on grave violations to bring perpetrators to justice.³⁸ They acknowledged this was not the MRM's purpose, but felt that it could play a greater role in addressing the high levels of impunity for grave violations.³⁹ For example, one United Nations respondent in South Sudan said: "I want to see more action after the collection of information. A lot of information has been collected and forwarded. It is high time that the sense of impunity by security forces comes to an end. I believe something is being done at the high level but there is a need on the ground to hold people more accountable."⁴⁰

Second, both UN and non-UN respondents said the MRM should respond directly to individual cases of grave violations, including through the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) if possible. Eleven

respondents in Colombia (eight from nongovernmental organizations, or NGOs, and three from the UN), and twelve respondents in South Sudan (nine from NGOs, three from the UN) said the MRM should make a greater contribution to strengthening programmatic response for victims of grave violations. One NGO respondent in South Sudan said: "The biggest challenge is what happens after reporting is done and how partners on the ground are able to respond for children."⁴¹ Of the 23 interviewees who mentioned response, many acknowledged the CTFMR's limited capacity to provide direct assistance, but stressed its potential for coordination.⁴²

In Watchlist's view, both perspectives on response could promote timely and appropriate assistance for victims of grave violations. While none of the CTFMRs have dedicated resources for service provision, its individual members do and that responsibility could be extended to their programming, much like cluster leads function as "providers of last resort."⁴³ Additionally, if one takes the view that response is the Task Force's responsibility, a dialogue among members could help identify what a nationally coordinated MRM response entails, what are the responsibilities of the Co-Chairs and the other members when they receive reports of grave violations, and which specific actions could be taken for each report received. At a minimum, the CTFMR could, for example, strengthen referral systems and advocate for greater access to services where it is most needed, which could help connect victims with appropriate service providers.

The varying interpretations of the MRM's purpose matter, as they influence the way it gathers, analyzes, and reports data. Currently, the MRM reports to the Security Council, whose main focus is to foster accountability and compliance of parties to conflict with international child protection standards and norms. As such, the MRM gathers case-specific, UN-verified data, which must be sufficiently reliable to establish that a grave violation has taken place. While this approach is highly important, some interviewees observed that it leads to underreporting of violations due to the detail of the information required for each reported incident.

Respondents from UN and non-UN agencies were more interested in the data's aggregate value but felt that the MRM often captured too small a sample of grave violations to produce trend analysis that is specific enough to inform program design.⁴⁴ In another example, a respondent from South Sudan stated that she can use trend data on recruitment and use of children and attacks on schools and hospitals for advocacy and program planning, but that the statistics on sexual violence, and killing and maiming of children appear to be undercounted and cannot be used to inform response.⁴⁵

In conclusion, the research found that specific views on the MRM's goal and purpose in Colombia and South Sudan reflected the respondents' different expectations of the mechanism. While both functions of upward reporting for accountability and local mobilization around response are equally valid approaches for achieving the broader goal of child protection, the CTFMR could ensure greater dialogue, especially with non-UN partners, on the mechanism's goal and purposes, and thus better manage expectations around its deliverables.

ii. The MRM Works Best when there is a Shared Sense of Ownership with Local Partners

The effectiveness of the MRM in both data gathering and response relies in great part on the CTFMR's leadership and its capacity to mobilize a wide variety of partners and create a shared sense of ownership in pursuing its goals and objectives. In particular, including local knowledge holders enhances the monitoring and verification of grave violations and helps inform targeted response. While local actors often face security risks for their monitoring work, national NGOs or community leaders' in-depth knowledge of the conflict is crucial. Local actors enjoy the trust of their communities, creating an enabling environment where victims can speak up about the abuses they suffered. They are present on the ground, including in places inaccessible to the UN, and will remain there long after the conflict ends.

Including local knowledge holders enhances the monitoring and verification of grave violations and helps inform targeted response.

In Colombia, national NGOs have played a leading role in shaping the CTFMR structure. The participation of NGOs has led to healthy dialogues on how the MRM should be implemented in the Colombian context and to unique innovations, such as adding internal displacement as a monitoring category.⁴⁶ It has improved the CTFMR's ability to identify cases of grave violations, conduct trainings, share information, and generate buy-in from a broader constituency.⁴⁷ The relationship between the UN and NGOs has been symbiotic—NGOs helped the UN learn about the Colombian context during early debates, while housing the MRM system within the UN has given NGOs leverage in advocating on grave violations.⁴⁸

In South Sudan, one of the challenges to broad CTFMR participation is the high number of weekly child protection coordination meetings in Juba and limited staff availability.⁴⁹ The UN has actively encouraged participation from a wider group of child protection experts, but attendance has remained low.⁵⁰ Respondents said time constraints impeded their participation as their organizations prioritized other emergency-related tasks.⁵¹

Despite the strong structure of the CTFMR in Colombia, some respondents said greater transparency and clarity about roles and responsibilities could strengthen its work as a coordination mechanism. An NGO member was concerned they lacked specific knowledge on verification procedures. Both UN and NGO members said they wanted more information about direct response for reported cases, and levels of funding for CTFMR activities. Some respondents were concerned that case information was not shared with the entire group. Although restricting access to confidential information typically increases security, some felt they were excluded from valuable information to which they should be privy as Task Force members.⁵²

In order to facilitate the operationalization of their mandate, the CTFMRs in Colombia and South Sudan have adopted a dual system of convening central, principal-level coordination meetings focusing on policy, and a separate technical working group for technical aspects of the MRM's implementation.

In Colombia, the CTFMR has established a *comité de casos* (case committee), comprised of a small group of technical experts who meet quarterly to determine which cases meet the criteria for inclusion in the Global Horizontal Notes⁵³ (GHN) and the Secretary-General's annual or country-specific reports.⁵⁴ Using a small group of technical experts streamlines decisions about which cases to include in the report.⁵⁵

In South Sudan, the technical working group meets bimonthly and is comprised of staff representing, for the most part, the CTFMR membership.⁵⁶ While the CTFMR's principal-level, Juba-based coordination meetings focus on recent developments regarding child protection initiatives,⁵⁷ the technical group meetings focus on aggregate data on grave violations and any resulting trends.⁵⁸ The preparation of submissions to the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG-CAAC), however, is a more centralized process led by the CTFMR principal Co-Chairs, who consult with technical experts from the members. An interviewee from a humanitarian agency mentioned the lack of systematic sharing of information between the Task Force's technical group and participants of its principal-level meetings, which limited members' capacity to coordinate MRM activities.⁵⁹

In South Sudan, decentralization through the creation of MRM coordination committees improves ownership.

In South Sudan, decentralization of the CTFMR structure through the creation of MRM coordination committees comprised of members of field-based child protection working groups, Protection Clusters, and/or Protection of Civilians sites coordination structures was seen as an effective way to improve regional participation and ownership. While each agency still reports cases to its headquarters in Juba, the coordination committee collects these reports at the local level to avoid duplication of information collection and to ensure a coordinated response to individual cases.⁶⁰ One respondent estimated that duplicate interviewing was reduced by about 35 percent since the committee's initiation. Information exchange within the group happens as frequently as once per week.⁶¹

Some members of the CTFMR felt minimal sense of ownership in the decision-making processes within the Task Force. In Colombia, some members felt that it was difficult to distinguish when the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as the CTFMR's Co-Chair, represented the group or acted in fulfillment of its own objectives and mandate. They expressed feeling only marginally included in group decisions.⁶²

In conclusion, the efficiency of the Colombia and South Sudan MRM in both data gathering and response relies greatly on its capacity to mobilize a wide variety of partners around a shared sense of ownership in pursuing the MRM's goals and objectives, and its ability to include local knowledge holders. According to several respondents, the review of internal documents, such as CTFMR terms of reference, or the development of shared advocacy strategies, could help overcome feelings of marginalization.

iii. Clear Guidance for Monitors and Coordinators is Needed

An effective mechanism requires clear guidance for monitors so they can contribute safely and ethically. The UN MRM Guidelines and Field Manual highlight the importance of developing clear information management protocols, including data confidentiality guidelines, minimum standards of verification, and information sharing pathways and security protocols. UN and civil society actors should be aware of what constitutes a violation, what type of information should be provided to the MRM focal point, how this information should be safely transferred, and how it is likely to be used to trigger a political or programmatic response. While some guidance is offered through in-country trainings on the Guidelines and the Field Manual, many interviewees noted the mechanism would benefit from more formalized, country-specific protocols. Another resource that is undervalued is Watchlist's "The 1612 Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism: A Resource Pack for NGOs."

In South Sudan, five respondents mentioned that reporting pathways are unclear due to the multitude of coordination bodies, overlapping mandates, and limited guidance on how to share information.⁶³ At times, reporting channels between NGOs in the field and Juba break down because of a lack of systems, focal points, and frequent staff turnover.⁶⁴ One respondent stressed the need for guidance on how to report certain cases of grave violations, including sexual violence against children by peacekeeping forces where they are considered a party to conflict.⁶⁵

In both Colombia and South Sudan, seven respondents mentioned the lack of oversight by the Co-Chairs over the monitoring and reporting practices of partner agencies.⁶⁶ The quality of the reporting process and safety procedures, including consent and confidentiality measures, are too often dependent on the internal practices of the reporting agency

rather than MRM standards. As a result, some case reports lack sufficient information, such as the name of the person who collected the data, which limits the ability to follow up and verify the information.

Sometimes the lack of specialized technical knowledge and high staff turnover can impact the quality of reporting and other aspects of MRM operations.⁶⁷ South Sudan, for example, has historically had difficulty attracting and retaining staff.

In Colombia, several respondents mentioned that the complexities of reporting are not well understood by CTFMR members in Bogotá. Members also attribute the poor quality and vagueness of information in some case reports to a lack of capacity, particularly among NGOs. While that is sometimes the case, both UN and non-UN reporting agencies also said they often receive vague information from survivors and witnesses afraid to file detailed cases.⁶⁸

...spur participation,
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In both countries, the CTFMRs have attempted to spur participation, strengthen monitoring standards, and standardize reporting through MRM training targeted at child protection partners. While the *Coalición contra la vinculación de niños, niñas y jóvenes al conflicto armado en Colombia (COALICO)* has played an important role conducting MRM trainings, there is a perception among CTFMR members that training should be a responsibility of the Co-Chairs.⁶⁹ In South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)/MRM focal point is very proactive in conducting trainings and respondents mentioned their quality has improved.⁷⁰ Trainings range from half- to full-day in length and are effective in raising awareness about grave violations and the MRM.⁷¹

Finally, staff turnover can have a significant impact on institutional memory, especially in South Sudan, where staff retention is a challenge. Little formal orientation is offered to new members that join the Task Force.⁷² The result is a gap in knowledge about their roles and the MRM.⁷³ Key MRM documents, such as the Global Good Practices Study, are unknown or

underutilized. Formative decisions in the implementation of the MRM were not well documented, which also causes a dearth of institutional memory.⁷⁴

In conclusion, respondents in both country cases expressed a desire for both orientation and continued training on information management protocols, data confidentiality guidelines, minimum standards of verification, and information sharing pathways and security protocols. Clear and ongoing guidance for both coordinators and monitors would improve their contribution to the MRM.

iv. A Multitude of Challenges Exist to Reporting and Verifying Violations

Respondents from UN and non-UN agencies in both countries believe that grave child rights violations go largely underreported. This is in part due to the monitoring approach the MRM uses to meet the verification requirements of its main target audience, the Security Council. Apart from this important limitation, there are several other challenges that contribute to underreporting.

Security and difficulty maintaining confidentiality are major reasons for underreporting. In Colombia, both reporting agencies and community members expressed a fear of retribution for reporting, given the disappearances or assassinations of individuals who speak out on violations perpetrated by parties to armed conflict.⁷⁵ Although reports are confidential, when an agency is the only one or one of a few child protection providers in an area, perpetrators may suspect and threaten its staff.⁷⁶ Armed non-state actors (ANSAs) are embedded in the communities where information circulates fluidly and a mere suspicion can lead to intimidation or other harmful consequences.⁷⁷

Limited mobility and access due to logistical constraints or insecurity was also identified as a major factor limiting the ability of reporting agencies to document and verify cases.

In Colombia, rural areas have some of the largest gaps in reporting and/or verifying. In some cases, the closest reporting agency may be a day's walk from some communities and inaccessible due to ANSAs operating in the area.⁷⁸ People in these communities may not have the financial means to travel, and if they do, they may face unreasonable risks in highly militarized areas where movement can be enough to raise suspicions.⁷⁹ In criminally controlled zones of many cities, like in Medellín, a *vacuna* (bribe fee) is often expected if residents move between neighborhoods.⁸⁰



South Sudan has one of the world's most difficult environments in terms of infrastructure and security. Most of the country's conflict-affected areas lack roads and transport. Other areas are inaccessible for extended periods of the year because of the rainy season.⁸¹ Even when a humanitarian regional hub is closer to an affected area, flying from Juba is often the only means of transportation. Security clearance must be obtained ahead of all humanitarian flights, so travel is sometimes limited.⁸² The result is that travel is costly and difficult.⁸³ When fighting erupts, UN staff and international NGOs vacate the area, which leaves a gap in reporting.⁸⁴ Insecurity is exacerbated by the lack of rule of law. Many areas of the country do not have judicial systems or police, leading to widespread impunity for perpetrators.⁸⁵ Although these issues have existed since before the current armed conflict, they are now exacerbated.⁸⁶

In South Sudan, a respondent identified decentralized, field-based sites as the best place to record information on violations.⁸⁷ To capture the data systematically, regional representatives of UNMISS and UNICEF coordinate consistent shifts in the regions surrounding humanitarian regional hubs.⁸⁸ Some internally displaced people expressed support for this type of data because it provides more anonymity than targeted onsite interviews.⁸⁹

Verifying reports in a timely manner is often challenging. As a result, many reports are instead included as "alleged" or "subject to verification." For example, despite having one of the largest Child Protection Units of any UN peacekeeping mission, many cases reported to UNMISS are left unverified due to the challenges mentioned above.⁹⁰ Understanding that the information they volunteer to the MRM will require further verification, some partners may simply provide the MRM with "alerts" instead of taking the time to submit more complete case reports.

The lack of a clear link between reporting and subsequent provision of services also negatively impacts reporting. In both country case studies, NGO respondents stated that affected communities largely do not know about the MRM but know who provides community services. Without clear evidence that reporting individual cases may improve access to services, a respondent felt that communities would not report cases, because the benefits of reporting do not outweigh the security concerns.⁹¹ Many international and national NGO staff and some UN personnel expressed ethical concerns about reporting cases when there is no direct programmatic response to assist the affected child.⁹² For example, one agency mentioned that it only shared cases with UNICEF when grave violations seemed widespread

or particularly severe because security risks for staff associated with reporting outweighed the benefits for survivors.⁹³ Three respondents wanted information on the specific services provided to a child as a result of reporting. Without this information, they did not feel that reporting was ethical or helpful to the children.⁹⁴

Stigma and other socio-cultural challenges to reporting were also expressed, with sexual violence often mentioned as a prime example. Community members and reporting agencies mentioned social intolerance and lack of awareness as major reasons for why reporting levels are low for certain violations.⁹⁵ In South Sudan, sexual violence may reduce marriage prospects of survivors and damage the family's reputation, particularly when a case is public knowledge in the community. Conversely, when violations are socially accepted—such as the recruitment and use of children in some communities—individuals may see no reason to report the practice.

Cross-border violations also present a unique challenge to monitoring and reporting. Violations taking place on one side of the border may very well be reported on the other side when insecurity forces populations to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Parties to conflict sometimes cross borders to fight or seek safe haven and may then target civilians in a neighboring state. The political sensitivities related to armed groups operating across borders create additional layers of complexity, which can inhibit agencies that would otherwise be more willing to report. The operational mandate of international agencies is also typically restricted geographically to the state that hosts them. In this context, cross-border monitoring and reporting requires coordination between country offices of the same agency or between different agencies operating in neighboring countries.

Still, in at least one region of MRM implementation, such mechanisms have been set up. The MRM for the Lord's Resistance Army-affected areas demands coordination between Task Forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic, and South Sudan. Given the international nature of this conflict, particularly in areas with porous borders, cross-border information sharing agreements between UN agencies would prove very useful. It could be interesting to explore information sharing between Sudan and South Sudan, or between South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya. In Colombia, the UN could also take the lead in exploring the possibility of sharing data across national borders, and is already working to create information-sharing channels transnationally.

In conclusion, the MRM in the two country cases faces multiple challenges to the monitoring, reporting, and verification of grave violations. As a result, respondents in both countries believe that violations committed against children go largely underreported. Some good practices to address these challenges include creative approaches to monitoring, such as the use of decentralized MRM coordination in South Sudan, and innovative information-sharing agreements between UN agencies across national borders.

v. Information Sharing Across Child Protection Communities Strengthens Coordination, Participation, and the Mechanism's Overall Efficiency

In both countries, the research has found that greater efforts could be made to share and disseminate information to the wider child protection community and pertinent decision makers. In Colombia, COALICO has been instrumental in informing the public about the MRM. Without its trainings and resources, knowledge would be very limited outside UN agencies. Even if the responsibility for disseminating MRM information should be shared among all CTFMR members, three respondents largely believed that this should be UNICEF's responsibility.⁹⁶ Dissemination is crucial in increasing knowledge of the MRM system and encouraging reporting as well as effective response.

The South Sudan CTFMR employs several effective information sharing and dissemination practices, especially given the operating environment. UNICEF successfully shares trend analyses of grave violations to a broader group of child protection actors on a monthly basis.⁹⁷ The trends are cited in Protection Cluster papers, and humanitarian actors who receive the trend analyses use the information in their organizational reports.⁹⁸

Leveraging information-sharing networks through greater coordination further strengthens the MRM.

Leveraging information-sharing networks through greater coordination further strengthens the MRM. In South Sudan, the UNMISS/MRM focal point has become more active in giving presentations on grave violations during Child Protection Sub-Cluster and Protection Cluster meetings.⁹⁹ The focal point meets at least monthly with pertinent staff from the Education Cluster and invites the Child Protection Sub-Cluster Coordinator to present information quarterly to the MRM technical working group.¹⁰⁰ UNICEF has recently engaged key staff members from the Protection Cluster in the MRM.¹⁰¹ Efforts are underway to better share information between UNMISS's Child Protection Unit and the Office of the Gender Advisor, which manages the Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (MARA).¹⁰² The Office of the Gender Advisor, in turn, has met with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), which monitors the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System (GBVIMS). As a result, UNFPA is creating a space in the GBVIMS to record if an armed group committed sexual violence, which can also benefit MRM-related reporting.¹⁰³

In conclusion, information sharing and feedback can help generate ownership and stimulate participation among partners while fostering greater transparency and accountability to a broader constituency. In both countries, UN and non-UN reporting agencies said they sometimes felt demotivated to report because they do not receive feedback on what happened with the cases. A representative from a humanitarian agency said that if outcomes of specific cases cannot be provided, information should at least be shared about trends and outcomes of advocacy actions.¹⁰⁴

vi. Creation of Annual Advocacy Strategies Improves Advocacy

In both countries, the CTFMR does not plan or execute advocacy as a group. In Colombia, the CTFMR could not unanimously decide on the group's advocacy messaging following intense debates. In lieu of a cohesive advocacy strategy, each organization decided to follow its own mandate and goals. This has led to a lack of coordination, since few organizations are aware of what the others are doing or which advocacy messages they are using. In South Sudan, CTFMR advocacy is led by the Co-Chairs. Priority issues and key messages are not discussed as a group, and the absence of an advocacy plan limits the CTFMR's ability to ensure individual initiatives are mutually reinforcing, to monitor progress, and to advise other stakeholders how they can support advocacy goals.

...action plans can mobilize
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In 2013, Watchlist researched the role of action plans in the UN's children and armed conflict (CAC) agenda.¹⁰⁵ It found that action plans can mobilize advocacy and establish continuous engagement between the UN and national authorities on protecting children in armed conflict. However, the number of listed parties that have signed action plans and the level of compliance is still limited, especially when it comes to ANSAs. When action plans exist, however, they can be used as the focus of advocacy efforts.¹⁰⁶

Following the establishment of South Sudan in 2011, for example, CTFMR members mobilized around the development and implementation of the 2012 Action Plan with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Significant progress was made to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children prior to the most recent outbreak of conflict in December 2013. Prior successes included the creation of a national technical committee to facilitate the implementation of the revised action plan; the establishment of a SPLA Child Protection Unit with offices in seven military divisions; the issuing of military command orders and directives providing unimpeded access to barracks for verification purposes and screening and registration of children associated with the SPLA; the release of nearly 1,000 children from the SPLA and armed groups; and the removal of troops from schools.¹⁰⁷

In situations where no action plans exist, CTFMR members can still develop space for dialogue with local authorities to strengthen their response to grave violations against children. In Colombia, no action plans have been negotiated with the listed armed groups given the government's refusal to grant the UN access to engage in dialogue with armed groups. However, advocacy remains a key activity for the CTFMR Co-Chairs in meetings with their liaison agency in the Colombian government, the Cancillería (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Regular meetings with the Colombian government have reduced fear and misconceptions about the MRM, leading to a constructive dialogue

between the two parties.¹⁰⁸ The latest peace talks between the Government of Colombia and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) have also created an opportunity for UN actors and NGOs to engage in direct dialogue on issues related to the protection of children. As a result, FARC-EP last year upped its minimum age for recruitment from 15 to 17, and increased it to 18 in February 2016.¹⁰⁹

In addition, Colombia offers a good example of how the CTFMR can mobilize support from the diplomatic community through the creation of a Group of Friends (GoF) of the children and armed conflict agenda—a collaboration of 24 embassies in Colombia that have an interest in the CAC agenda, based on a similar country-specific model in the DRC and on the GoF in New York.¹¹⁰ The Embassy of Canada chairs the group, which meets yearly. The GoF can provide much-needed support to the CTFMR and others working to improve the government’s commitment to CAC issues.¹¹¹

Advocacy by CTFMR members typically follows the release of the Secretary-General’s country-specific and

annual reports and draws on their recommendations.¹¹² In both countries, nearly all respondents mentioned the importance of the annual and country-specific reports, and conclusions by the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.¹¹³ At the same time, respondents critiqued the country-specific reports for their irregularity and infrequency—in Colombia, the last such report was released in March 2012.¹¹⁴ The next report, scheduled to be released this year, will cover the period of August 2011 through 2015.¹¹⁵

While high-level advocacy can achieve results, local advocacy was also described as important and effective. The conflict in South Sudan is highly decentralized, and local authorities often hold the most power.¹¹⁶ To this end, CTFMR members have engaged with local military commanders and traditional leaders.¹¹⁷ UNMISS’s unique capability to engage parties to conflict safely is seen as an important niche role.¹¹⁸ UNICEF’s practice of sharing trend reports monthly provides organizations with important information for independent advocacy.¹¹⁹



Conclusion and Recommendations

In 2005, Security Council Resolution 1612 established a unique global Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) to provide the Council with “timely, objective, accurate and reliable information” on six grave violations against children in armed conflict. Following the Secretary-General’s 2015 annual report, it is active in 15 conflict situations around the world. The MRM is a vital instrument to protect children in war from some of the most egregious violations of their rights.

Operating in challenging environments, Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR) members often adopt innovative practices to strengthen the MRM’s implementation. In Colombia, the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) led to unique innovations, such as adding internal displacement as a monitoring category. Meanwhile, housing the MRM system within the United Nations provided Colombian NGOs with the necessary leverage to advocate on grave violations. In South Sudan, the creation of local MRM coordination committees has increased local participation and ownership, and allowed for the recording of violations in a more systematic and confidential way. In South Sudan, the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) MRM focal point is proactive in liaising with the Child Protection Sub-Cluster, as well as the Protection and Education Clusters. Finally, sustained, joint advocacy by CTFMR members, even in situations where there are no action plans, has led to important successes, such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo’s recent acceptance of 18 as the minimum age for recruitment.

At the same time, the research identified a number of areas for improvement. The MRM is a mechanism designed to foster accountability and compliance of parties to conflict with international child protection standards and norms, while at the same time contribute to effective responses to protect children. However, it is challenging for the MRM to address both the accountability and response components. Some actors believe the MRM’s primary purpose is to provide rigorous evidence to the Security Council on accountability and compliance with international norms. Those actors place a high emphasis on obtaining UN-verified information about individual cases, even if that implies reducing the number of cases reported. On the other hand, those who want the MRM to inform programmatic response expect it to collect information on more cases and better assess the full scope of what is happening and who is most affected.¹²⁰

The failure to reconcile these perspectives perpetuates a source of tension around unfulfilled expectations, and leaves unexplored alternative systems for collecting and/

or verifying violations. Under the status quo, service providers (namely those within the child protection and gender-based violence, or GBV, sectors) are more skeptical of the time and specialized skills required to engage in the MRM. Perceived and actual security risks to their staff, and their relationships with community members and survivors, may also negatively impact service providers’ decision to engage. Understanding that the CTFMR has limited capacity to verify information, many NGOs may find little incentive to risk reporting violations. On the other hand, addressing this tension could result not only in more comprehensive MRM data, but also in greater engagement of NGO child protection practitioners, who are critical for producing information that can lead to accountability and better response.

The research also highlighted the need to provide both MRM monitors and coordinators with additional guidance and training; to address the various challenges to reporting; to share information more widely among the child protection community; to establish cross-border information sharing agreements regarding violations; and to develop joint advocacy strategies for CTFMRs as a means to both pursue action plan negotiations and press for compliance. By addressing these elements, the UN could improve the MRM at the field level, and better protect children affected by armed conflict.

Recommendations

CTFMR Structure and Purpose

- MRM stakeholders at the national and international levels should develop a common understanding on what the MRM’s contribution should be to programmatic response.
- CTFMR Co-Chairs could invite members to discuss and amend accordingly the terms of reference to clarify their specific roles and responsibilities.
- The CTFMR could support the creation of localized MRM subgroups responsible for strengthening the MRM at the regional level.¹²¹ Committees could appoint a local MRM focal point, define clear reporting pathways, ensure linkages with referral systems and liaise with authorities for local advocacy.

- Donors should continue to fund the MRM at the national and global level while also funding NGO engagement in the mechanism.
- The CTFMR could consider annual discussions to clarify the MRM's purpose and function and increase understanding and buy-in at the national level.

Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification

- Reporting on violations against children by the CTFMR and headquarters should include information on verified cases, as well as unverified cases and/or broader estimates regarding violations. While verified cases are essential for listing parties in the Secretary-General's reports, information on additional cases and estimates could provide insight into actual prevalence.
- The CTFMR Co-Chairs should seek strategies to address the underreporting of violations, such as in cases of sexual violence. Suggestions include: working with agencies that have long-standing relationships with the affected communities, linking aggregate data on services to MRM or Monitoring, Analysis, and Reporting Arrangements on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (MARA) reporting systems, and partnering with agencies that conduct education and awareness campaigns.¹²²
- The CTFMR and reporting agencies could support the systematic mapping of MRM reporting and verification practices annually. Assessment should include geographic areas with most challenges to reporting and the reasons why cases go unverified. When gaps are identified, the CTFMR could seek strategies to address them and thus increase its capacity for verification.
- UN country offices could consider establishing cross-border information sharing initiatives. For example, in South Sudan, UNMISS could consider information sharing agreements with peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, and Abyei.

Guidance and Training

- The CTFMR should ensure all members have key documents, including the UN Guidelines and Field Manual for the MRM and the MRM Global Good Practices Study. It could also create an orientation packet for new members to ensure an understanding of the purpose, structure, and functioning of the MRM. The packet could include key contacts, information on important developments related to MRM in-country operations, membership responsibilities, and other

guiding documents. The packet could be revised annually to ensure it is up to date. Similarly, handover notes prepared by members leaving the CTFMR could facilitate transition.

- The CTFMR could develop country-specific guidance for monitoring, reporting, and responding to cases of grave violations, and ensure all members are aware of reporting pathways, information management protocols, data confidentiality guidelines, minimum standards of verification, reference to how the information will be used, and standard operating procedures on MRM response.
- Based on a needs assessment, CTFMR members should develop country-specific training that capitalizes on the local resources, in particular those in the human rights and GBV sectors. Training should focus on priority areas (including interviewing techniques, confidentiality and security, minimum standards of verification, and ethics in reporting and responding to violations), be tailored to particular audiences, and be regularly provided.

Information Sharing and Dissemination

- The CTFMR Co-Chairs should ensure that regular trend analyses are created and systematically disseminated to the targeted audience. Trend analyses should also be posted in a public forum, such as a website or a newsletter, to improve public access and awareness.¹²³
- The CTFMR could benefit greatly from interaction with other coordination networks. For example, it could pursue agreements with the Education and Health Clusters and the World Health Organization for data on attacks on education and health care.

Accountability, Compliance, and Advocacy

- The CTFMR Co-Chairs could lead yearly discussions with all members to develop annual advocacy strategies and work plans, which should include a budget and a fundraising strategy.
- The CTFMR Co-Chairs could help develop annual joint advocacy strategies highlighting priority issues, objectives, key messages targeted to specific audiences, and roles and responsibilities of each member. Members should report on initiatives to monitor progress towards specific goals.¹²⁴ Space could be reserved quarterly in CTFMR meetings to discuss advocacy opportunities, successes, and challenges.

Endnotes

- 1 The six grave violations are recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming, rape and other forms of sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, abduction, and denial of humanitarian access to children; United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1612 (2005), S/RES/1612 (2005), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/SC-Resolution-16121.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 2(a).
- 2 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG-CAAC), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), "Field Manual - Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict," June 2014, http://www.mrmtools.org/mrm/files/MRM_Field_5_June_2014.pdf (accessed November 15, 2015), p. 2.
- 3 MRM countries/situations include: Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iraq, Lord's Resistance Army-affected areas, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen; UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/69/926*-S/2015/409*), June 5, 2015, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/926&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (accessed November 15, 2015).
- 4 Informal task forces or working groups monitoring grave violations of children's rights have also been set up in some countries where the MRM is not formally operational, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
- 5 Depending on the country situation, other UN agencies may include: the International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), and World Food Programme (WFP); OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF and DPKO, "Guidelines: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict," June 2014, [http://www.mrmtools.org/mrm/files/MRM_Guidelines_-_5_June_2014\(1\).pdf](http://www.mrmtools.org/mrm/files/MRM_Guidelines_-_5_June_2014(1).pdf) (accessed November 15, 2015), p. 12.
- 6 OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF, and DPKO, "Guidelines and Field Manual: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict."
- 7 Annex I lists parties to conflict active in armed conflict situations that are on the Security Council's agenda, while annex II consists of perpetrators in situations of armed conflict not on the Council's agenda, or are other situations of concern; UN Security Council, Resolution 1379 (2001), S/RES/1379 (2001), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Resolution-1379-20-November-2001.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 16.
- 8 The resolution expands the trigger for listing to include parties responsible for patterns of killing and maiming of children and rape and other sexual violence against children; UN Security Council, Resolution 1882 (2009), S/RES/1882 (2009), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CAC-SRES-1882.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 3.
- 9 The resolution expands the trigger for listing to include parties responsible for recurrent attacks on schools and/or hospitals and/or in recurrent attacks or threats of attacks against protected persons in relation to schools and/or hospitals; UN Security Council, Resolution 1998 (2011), S/RES/1998 (2011), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/SC-Resolution-1998.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 3.
- 10 The resolution expands the trigger for listing to include parties responsible for patterns of abduction against children; UN Security Council, Resolution 2225 (2015), S/RES/2225 (2015), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/UNSC-2225-2015.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 3.
- 11 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/69/926*-S/2015/409*).
- 12 The Mission of Canada to the UN created a Group of Friends (GoF) of the CAC agenda, which monitors and participates in the agenda's development. The group serves as an alternative forum for countries not represented on the Security Council Working Group.
- 13 UN Security Council, Letter dated May 2, 2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/AC.51/2007/1, July 31, 2008, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/AC.51/2007/1 (accessed November 15, 2015), pp. 2-3.
- 14 UN Security Council, Resolution 1539 (2004), S/RES/1539 (2004), <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Resolution-1539-22-April-2005.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), para. 5.
- 15 See action plan templates; OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF, and DPKO, "Field Manual - Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict," Annex 12. For a template of an action plan with parties responsible for attacks on schools and/or hospitals, see OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF, World Health Organization (WHO), and UNESCO, "Protect Schools + Hospitals: Guidance Note on Security Council Resolution 1998," May 2014, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/AttackonSchoolsHospitals.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), Annex IV.
- 16 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/62/609-S/2007/757), December 21, 2007, <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/SG-annual-report-2007.pdf> (accessed March 3, 2016), para. 17.
- 17 On January 25, 2016, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2261, establishing a political mission in Colombia to oversee a definitive bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities, and the setting aside of arms by the Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) rebels. The 12-month mission, renewable by request of the parties, will be set up upon the signing of a final peace agreement. United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, "Security Council Decides to Establish Political Mission in Colombia Tasked with Monitoring, Verifying Ceasefire, Cessation of Hostilities," January 25, 2016, <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12218.doc.htm> (accessed March 18, 2015).

- 18 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/55/163-S/2000/712), July 19, 2000, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2000/712 (accessed November 10, 2015).
- 19 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/58/546-S/2003/1053*), November 10, 2003, <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/SG-annual-report-2003.pdf> (accessed November 15, 2015), Annex II.
- 20 Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "No One to Trust: Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia," April 2012, <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Watchlist-ColombiaReport-LR.pdf> (accessed January 22, 2015), p. 11.
- 21 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, (A/69/926*-S/2015/409*), Annex II.
- 22 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Colombia (S/2012/171*), March 21, 2012, <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012-Colombia-CAC-Report.pdf> (accessed February 12, 2016).
- 23 OSRSG-CAAC, "UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict Welcomes Commitment by FARC-EP to End Child Recruitment in Colombia," November 5, 2015, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/special-representative-for-children-and-armed-conflict-welcomes-commitment-by-farc-ep-to-end-child-recruitment-colombia/> (accessed January 1, 2016).
- 24 Colombian law prohibits any type of relations with non-state armed groups without the previous authorization of the President of Colombia, according to Article 10 of Law 418 (1997), extended by Law 548 (1999).
- 25 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 6, 2015.
- 26 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 15, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, August 3, 2015.
- 27 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 28 David Smith, "South Sudan: The Death of a Dream," *The Guardian*, January 20, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/south-sudan-death-of-a-dream> (accessed January 24, 2016).
- 29 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/69/926*-S/2015/409*), Annex I.
- 30 "Recommitment by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the United Nations (UN) for Ending Grave Violations Against Children in the Republic of South Sudan," entered into force June 24, 2014.
- 31 UN Security Council, Report of the UN Secretary-General on children and armed conflict (A/69/926*-S/2015/409*), para. 170.
- 32 "Action Plan between the Sudan People's Liberation Army – in Opposition (SPLA-IO) and the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting in South Sudan committing the SPLA-IO to end and prevent recruitment and use of children and killing and maiming of children," entered into force December 26, 2015.
- 33 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 3, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 20, 2015.
- 34 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 18, 2015.
- 35 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015.
- 36 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 20, 2015.
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- 38 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015.
- 39 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015.
- 40 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), November 30, 2015.
- 41 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), November 16, 2015.
- 42 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 15, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 43 For more background on the cluster approach and the concept of provider of last resort, see: Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), "Operational Guidance on the Concept of Last Resort," June 20, 2008, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/IASC%20Guidance%20on%20Provider%20of%20Last%20Resort.pdf> (accessed April 5, 2016).
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- 45 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 46 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), former representative from a humanitarian agency, July 17, 2015.
- 47 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.

- 48 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), former representative from a humanitarian agency, July 17, 2015.
- 49 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015.
- 50 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 51 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), November 23, 2015; (name and location withheld), November 19, 2015; (name and location withheld), November 17, 2015; (name and location withheld), November 16, 2015.
- 52 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 15, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 53 The Global Horizontal Note (GHN) provides timely updates on the situation of children affected by armed conflict across several situations, which enable the Working Group to stay informed about important trends and developments that can lead to faster action and response than what may follow from the Secretary-General's annual country reports on children and armed conflict. The Country Task Forces on Monitoring and Reporting must provide quarterly inputs for the GHN, which is compiled by the OSRSG-CAAC with comments from UNICEF and DPKO. OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF, and DPKO, "Field Manual - Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations against Children in Situations of Armed Conflict," p. 36.
- 54 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 55 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), former representative from a humanitarian agency, July 17, 2015.
- 56 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 57 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 58 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 59 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 60 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015.
- 61 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015.
- 62 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), former representative from a humanitarian agency, July 17, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 63 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (d), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), three representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 64 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 28, 2015.
- 65 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015.
- 66 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 14, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015; (name and location withheld) (c), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 1, 2015.
- 67 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 19, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 21, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, October 26, 2015.
- 68 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 24, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 14, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
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- 71 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 1, 2015.
- 72 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 73 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 14, 2015; (name and location withheld) (c), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 14, 2015.
- 74 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), former representative from a humanitarian agency, July 17, 2015.

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- 76 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 9, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 25, 2015.
- 77 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 27, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 9, 2015.
- 78 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 24, 2015.
- 79 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), four representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 31, 2015.
- 80 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 21, 2015.
- 81 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 20, 2015.
- 82 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (d), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 83 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 3, 2015.
- 84 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 7, 2015.
- 85 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015.
- 86 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 19, 2015.
- 87 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 21, 2015.
- 88 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015.
- 89 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 9, 2015.
- 90 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015.
- 91 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 24, 2015.
- 92 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 3, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 20, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 19, 2015.
- 93 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 94 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (c), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 95 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 28, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), three representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 27, 2015.
- 96 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 15, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 97 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 98 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 23, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, October 26, 2015.
- 99 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 23, 2015.
- 100 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 23, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 20, 2015.
- 101 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, October 26, 2015.
- 102 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015.
- 103 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), three representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 23, 2015.
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- 106 "Joint NGO Remarks SRSR-CAAC/UNICEF Campaign launch, 'Children, not Soldiers,' UN Headquarters, New York, 6 March 2014," <http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Joint-NGO-statement-SRSR-UNICEF-CAMPAIGN-FINAL.pdf> (accessed December 15, 2015).

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- 114 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Colombia (S/2012/171*).
- 115 Watchlist communique (name withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, January 18, 2016.
- 116 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 19, 2015; (name and location withheld) (d), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 117 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 3, 2015.
- 118 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 8, 2015; (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 30, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 18, 2015.
- 119 Watchlist interview (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015.
- 120 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, July 15, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, July 9, 2015.
- 121 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 21, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 19, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 13, 2015.
- 122 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, December 1, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 28, 2015.
- 123 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (d), two representatives from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015; (name and location withheld) (a), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 17, 2015.
- 124 Watchlist interviews (name and location withheld) (b), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 16, 2015; (name and location withheld), representative from a humanitarian agency, November 1, 2015.

Annex

Key Informant Interview Guide



Instructions: Evaluators should use probing questions when necessary to gain more information. A list of suggested prompts is included for most questions. All other questions should be asked in full.

Begin each interview by:

- Introducing yourself and the purpose of the evaluation
- Mentioning that there may be some questions that a respondent cannot answer
- Providing the option of interviews remaining anonymous
- Asking respondents if they still would like to participate

Introduction

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
1. Can you please provide your name and title?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
2. How do you participate in MRM activities?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
3. How do other members of your agency participate in MRM activities?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members

CTFMR Structure

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>4. What aspects of the Country Task Force are working well?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Meeting logistics? ● Meeting facilitation? ● Sub-groups for coordination or data analysis? ● Report writing? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
<p>5. What aspects of the Country Task Force could be strengthened?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Meeting logistics? ● Meeting facilitation? ● Sub-groups for coordination or data analysis? ● Report writing? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members

(CTFMR Structure cont'd)

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>6. Are any other types of coordination structures outside of the Country Task Force needed?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Why are they needed? • What about regional coordination structures? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>

Data Entry and Management

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>7. In an ideal world, what kinds of trend analyses of grave violations should be conducted? How often?</p> <p><i>Prompt:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For which sub-categories of information? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Manager</p>
<p>8. How can security measures for data entry and storage be improved?</p> <p><i>Prompt:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are emergency procedures in place? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Manager</p>
<p>9. How can data quality be improved for the database?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is the data query process? • Are there other databases that feed into the MRM database? How can data quality be improved in these databases? • How often and regularly is data shared from these external sources? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Manager</p>

Reporting

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>10. What are the challenges to reporting? How can they be addressed?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the security issues to reporting? How can they be addressed? • What are the access issues to reporting? How can they be addressed? • What aspects of culture may limit reporting? How can they be addressed? • Are communities aware of reporting options? Why would community members not be able to report? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>

(Reporting cont'd)

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>11. Do gaps exist in reporting coverage? Why?</p> <p><i>Prompt:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● How can they be addressed? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>12. Are all six grave violations equally reported on?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Why not? ● How can unequal reporting be addressed? ● Do all grave violations have an equal average time in which they are reported? Are some reported later than others? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>13. What supplemental types of information should be recorded on grave violations?</p> <p><i>Prompt:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● What other types of abuses against children as part of the conflict should be systematically recorded? Why? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>14. How does the Country Task Force ensure that it receives information on violations committed by non-listed actors?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs</p>
<p>15. What is the practice for monitoring and reporting across national borders?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Managers</p>
<p>16. Do you have any recommendations on improving the quality, accuracy, and timeliness of reporting?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● For international NGOs? ● For others? ● Use of a standardized recording form? In what contexts? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>17. How could confidentiality and security measures be strengthened for reporting?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>

Verification

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>18. What is the policy for ensuring that informed consent is obtained by UN agencies when reporting or verifying grave violations? How is it ensured in practice?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● How do UN agencies ensure that witnesses or survivors understand informed consent? ● What practices do UN agencies use to ensure that witnesses and survivors understand how the information will be used? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>
<p>19. What is the policy for ensuring that UN agencies collect information in a standardized way when reporting or verifying grave violations? How is it ensured in practice?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Matching the survivor with a person of the same gender in cases of sexual violence? ● Age appropriate strategies? ● Interviewing in a private place? ● Interviewing with or without parents or caregiver? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>
<p>20. What practices do UN agencies use to reduce repeat interviews of the same witness or survivor during reporting or verifying of grave violations?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Coordination bodies at the site? ● Coordination with non-UN agencies in collecting certain pieces of information? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>
<p>21. How do UN agencies ensure the referral and linkage of cases to services in reporting or verifying grave violations?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>
<p>22. What are some reasons why a case would not be verified?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Are there differences among the verifying agencies? What are they? ● For certain grave violations over others? Why? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Managers</p>
<p>23. How can the verification process be improved?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs</p>

Information Sharing and Dissemination

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
24. How could the Country Task Force Co-Chairs better exchange information with Country Task Force members?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
25. How could Country Task Force members better exchange information with each another?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
26. How could the Country Task Force better share information with stakeholders nationally?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
27. How could data sharing be strengthened between the MRM database and other pertinent databases? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● What kinds of practices facilitate the movement of information? ● How could the MRM database structure be changed to better facilitate the systematic capture and synchronization of information? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs Information Managers

Training

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
28. How often should Country Task Force members be trained, accounting for current turnover rates?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
29. How often should stakeholders be trained, accounting for current turnover rates? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● For international NGO staff? ● For national civil society agencies? ● For government officials? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
30. How could the current training be improved? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● In structure? ● In content? ● In length? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
31. What kinds of follow-up trainings are needed? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● For Country Task Force members? ● For international NGO staff? ● For national civil society agencies? ● For government officials? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members

Advocacy

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
32. How does the Country Task Force use MRM trends data to inform its advocacy?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
33. How do the Country Task Force Co-Chairs use action plans in their advocacy? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are some good practices in using action plans for advocacy? • What are some practices that have not been successful in using action plans for advocacy? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs
34. How does the Country Task Force use the Secretary-General's recommendations and the Security Council's conclusions in its advocacy? <i>Prompt:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can you give a specific example? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
35. What advocacy practices have been most effective in general to counter grave violations? <i>Prompt:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who have been the targets of the advocacy? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
36. Could you highlight 2-3 advocacy achievements of the Country Task Force from the past year? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who were the targets of the advocacy? • Has any regional advocacy occurred? What kinds? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members

Linkages to Child Protection System

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
37. Which key sectors or actors do not participate in MRM activities currently? Why?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
38. Which other sectors or actors should be engaged in MRM activities? <i>Prompts:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education sector? • Gender-based violence sector? • Specific ministries? 	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members
39. How can the MRM system better coordinate actors that prevent and directly respond to grave violations?	CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members

General

Question(s)	Suggested KIs
<p>40. Is there a current funding gap for the MRM system? Why?</p> <p><i>Prompts:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● What percentage increase in funding is needed to create an optimal system? ● Does the Country Task Force conduct fundraising activities? With whom? How often? 	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members</p>
<p>41. Are there any other gaps in the MRM system that you would like to mention?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>42. Are there any other successes or innovative features of the MRM system that you would like to mention?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>
<p>43. Is there anything else that we have not covered that you would like to add?</p>	<p>CTFMR Co-Chairs CTFMR Members Information Managers</p>

Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict

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